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Abstract: We develop a water allocation and irrigation technology adoption model under 
the prior appropriation doctrine with asymmetric information among heterogeneous 
farmers and between farmers and water authorities; farmers’ heterogeneity is defined by a 
mix of land quality and knowledge.  We find that adverse selection reduces the adoption 
of modern irrigation technology.  We also show that even with asymmetric information, 
incentives for water trade exist and lead to additional technology adoption with gains to 
all parties.  This suggests that under asymmetric information, a thin secondary market 
improves the allocation of water resources and induces additional adoption of modern 
irrigation technologies. 
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Irrigation Technology Adoption and Gains from Water Trading Under 
Asymmetric Information 
 
In several regions in the US, the prior appropriation doctrine is used to allocate water.  
Under this doctrine, priority of right is determined according to the "first in time, first in 
right" rule and senior water users can take as much water as they can beneficially use.  
Such systems result in nonmarginal pricing of water that does not reflect the scarcity 
value of water.  This together with a "use it or lose it" rule on water under which water 
rights cannot be transferred or sold lead to inefficiency in the allocation of water across 
users (Burness and Quirk) and reduced incentives to conserve water in times of scarcity 
or to adopt efficient irrigation technologies (Zilberman, MacDougall and Shah). 
To reduce the inefficiencies inherent in such a system, some states, e.g., Oregon, 
Idaho, Colorado, and Utah, are assigning water quotas and a water fee depending on 
intended use, seniority of water right, and availability of resources.
1  The U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation recommends setting water rates that would lead to efficient use of water but 
acknowledges the difficulties that arise from "gathering the technical details to support 
the design and administration of workable rate schedules."(p.12).  Other states, or at least 
California in 1991, are moving towards water markets in order to increase efficiency of 
water use (Howitt).  Asymmetric information about heterogeneous land qualities and 
values attached to water between users and the water agency can distort the determination 
of water quotas and fees under the prior appropriation doctrine; it can also impede the 
allocation of property rights to water and water trades that would achieve efficient water   2
use.  Additionally, transactions costs and an inadequate numbers of willing buyers and 
sellers within geographic areas limited by constraints in transporting water could also 
cause markets for water to fail to achieve efficiency (Freyfogle; Livingston, 1993). 
The purpose of this article is twofold.  First, we seek to examine the impact of 
asymmetric information on the regulator’s decision problem of assigning water quotas 
among farmers while taking into account their prior appropriation rights.  In the absence 
of complete information about heterogeneous farmer’s types, defined by their land 
quality, which influences their irrigation technology choice and water use, we examine 
the design of an incentive mechanism by which the regulator assigns quotas and sets a fee 
for water use.  We examine its implications for modern irrigation technologies adoption 
and water use as compared to those under full information.  We do this by applying the 
general mechanism design framework in Laffont and Tirole to determine water quotas 
and fees under asymmetric information.  We then extend that framework to analyze the 
gains from water trading under asymmetric information.  Due to transportation 
constraints, trading typically has to be confined geographically and would most likely be 
among a few water users.  We therefore focus on bilateral water trades through an 
independent broker and analyze its implications for additional technology adoption and 
social welfare.
2 
Our article differs from the existing literature on irrigation technology adoption 
and water markets in several ways.  Caswell and Zilberman analyze technology adoption 
decisions under perfect information with no constraint on water availability.  Smith and 
Tsur address the design of incentive compatible mechanisms for water pricing under   3
asymmetric information but focus on riparian rights.  Neither study considers water 
trading.  In the absence of water trading, senior water right holders have the incentive to 
irrigate all their land, which leaves the junior right holder with little or no water (Burness 
and Quirk) and to keep using traditional irrigation technologies (Shah, Zilberman and 
Chakravorty).  Carey and Zilberman extend this to analyze the implications of water 
markets for irrigation technology choice under uncertainty about water availability and 
price while Dinar and Letey analyze the implications of water markets for drainage 
reduction.  The above studies ignore an important aspect of the problem, namely the 
inefficiencies in water use and pricing introduced by asymmetric information and its 
implications for the efficiency of water markets. 
Our results show that under asymmetric information the optimal water quotas for 
the senior right holders are smaller than under full information, therefore leaving more 
water for junior right holders.  However, the optimal incentive mechanism imposes lower 
water fees under asymmetric information than under full information, particularly on the 
high quality senior right holders who use the traditional irrigation technology.  Together 
this leads to less adoption of modern irrigation technology under asymmetric information 
than under full information.  Furthermore, we find that under conditions of adverse 
selection, a secondary water-trading phase or "second market" should be considered in 
order to improve water allocation.  We show that even under asymmetric information, 
bilateral water trading can increase social efficiency of water allocation and leads to more 
modern irrigation technology adoption than the non-trading situation without inducing 
further budgetary strain on the regulator.  In the next section, we present our theoretical   4
framework and a benchmark model where water quotas are determined under full 
information and are not transferable.  We then introduce asymmetric information, 
examine its implications in the absence of water trading, and then examine the gains from 




We consider N farmers, indexed by i=1,…,N producing the same crop, using water and 
irrigation technologies as inputs, and facing an exogenous output price P.  Farmers are 
heterogeneous in their type, e.g., land quality and skills, denoted by  i θ .  Farmer types are 
assumed to be independently distributed from each other with density  () i f θ  and a 
cumulative distribution  () i F θ  over the support  , θ θ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦. 
 
The Irrigation Technology 
Farmers have a choice of two alternative irrigation technologies,  { } , tL H ∈  where L is 
the traditional technology such as furrow irrigation, and H is the modern technology such 
as sprinkler or drip.  These technologies differ in the effectiveness with which they 
enable the effective uptake of applied irrigation water by crops.  Applied water per acre is 
denoted by 
t
i w .  The portion of this water effectively consumed by crops depends on land 
quality and irrigation technology.  We assume a linear relation between effective water 
use 
t
i e  and applied water with a multiplicative quality-augmenting function   5
()
tt t
ii i i eh w θ = , where  ()
t
ii h θ  is the irrigation effectiveness of technology t for farmer i.  
The function 
t h  is the percentage of water absorbed or used effectively by the crop, 
hence it takes values from 0 to 1.  We assume that  (.)
t
i h  is non-decreasing with 
() ()
HL
ii i i hh θ θ ≥  and is concave with  ( ) 1
H
i h θ = .  We distinguish between the parameter 
of land quality or agents' types,  , i θ θθ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ , and the effectiveness of irrigation technology 









.  When the traditional technology is in use  1 i α =  
and when the modern technology is in use  ] [ 0,1 i α ∈ .  The per-acre fixed cost of the 
traditional technology is  0
L c = , while that of the modern technology is  0
H c > . 
 
The Production Function 
Output per acre is denoted by 
t
i y  and is assumed to be a function of the quantity of 
effective water used by farmer i when technology t is adopted.  Caswell and Zilberman 














and show that the optimal quantity of applied water decreases with respect to farmer’s 
type when  1
t
i emp > .  To keep our analysis tractable, while allowing for  1
t
i emp >  we 
assume that the production function is quadratic, as in Caswell, Lichtenberg, and 
Zilberman, and Khanna, Isik, and Zilberman.  The constant returns to scale production 
function for farmer i is represented by   6
() () () { }
2
,() m a x  ()  (), 0
tt tt tt
ii i i i i i ywh db w h a w h θθ θ =− + − , where  i y  is yield per acre, 
0, 0, and  0 ab d >> ≥  are constants. 
 
Profit Maximization and Irrigation Technology Choice 
For every unit of water, there is a private cost k of diverting it from its source to the field. 
 With g  being the per-unit cost of water, the per-acre profit (in dollars) for farmer i under 
technology t is thus defined by: 
(1)     () ( ) ,() ,()
tt t t t t t t
i iii i iii i i wh P ywh k w g w c πθ θ = −−− , 
where P is the price per unit yield. 
The profit maximization problem is analyzed in two stages; in the first stage, the 
water input is determined given a technology t then in the second stage, the farmer selects 
the technology that yields the highest profit.  When  i θ θ =  yield and profits with either 
technology would be zero and neither technology will be adopted.  When i θ θ = , both 
technologies will be equally efficient and there will be no water use savings with the 
adoption of the modern technology.  Given fixed adoption costs of 
H c , Caswell, 
Zilberman, and Casterline show that the profit differential (net of the fixed costs of 
adoption) declines as θ  increases.  Given the assumptions that  ( )
H
ii h θ  is concave and 
1
t
i emp > , they also show that there is a single crossing point between 
L
i π  and 
H
i π .  For 
,
s
i θ θθ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ , where 
s θ  solves  ) ( ) ( s L
i
s H
i θ π θ π =  such that  { } 0, ,
t
i tL H π >∀ ∈ , farmers 
adopt the modern technology (t=H) since 
H L
ii π π ≥  and  0
H
i π ≥ .  For  ,
s
i θ θθ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦  the   7
traditional technology is selected (t=L).  Therefore, the proportion of farmers adopting the 
modern irrigation technology is  ( )
s F θ . 
The total quantity of water available to farmers in the region is assumed to be 
fixed at w; farmers divert water according to the priority set when they apply for water 
rights.  We assume that water is allocated according to the modified prior appropriation 
scheme whereby farmers are ranked according to seniority,  1,..., iN = , with farmer 1 
being the most senior and N the most junior.  Furthermore, we assume that farmers with 
senior water rights are always allocated enough water to at least break even but that some 
junior right holders may be left without water. 
 
Model Assumptions 








≤  for all  , i θ θθ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ , 
and that total demand exceeds supply.  We also assume that  1
t
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Water Allocation under Full Information: Prior Appropriation Doctrine 
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, water allocation is determined by seniority of 
right with farmers at the front of the queue being allowed to use as much water as they 
can beneficially use while junior farmers at the end of the queue receive the residual 
water.  We now consider the problem of the regulator who seeks to determine water 
quotas for each farmer to maximize social benefits constrained by the seniority of rights 
and water availability.  The regulator determines the water quota of each farmer in the 
queue sequentially by maximizing the social benefit generated by allocating water to that 
farmer.  We assume that senior right holders will be granted enough water to at least 
break even and continue production.  The social benefit does not encompass the 
environmental externalities due to water use. 
Livingston (1998) reports the existence of water commissioners who act as "River 
Cops" who monitor the use of water and ensure that the established priorities and 
allocation levels are respected.  Such activity is costly to society due to transactions costs 
and the social cost of raising public funds to undertake such expenditures.  Additionally, 
there could be an environmental cost associated with the use of water.  The social cost of 
water is therefore represented () 1
t
i gw λ +  where 01 λ < < .  The social gain generated by 
farmer l is therefore represented as follows: 
(2)     () ( ) ( ) ,() ,() 1
tt t t t t t t
i iii i iii i i Sw h P yw h k w g w c θθ λ = −− + − . 
With 1,..., 1 li =−  being the index for all water users holding water rights senior to 
i’s, under full information, the regulator's problem is:   9












≤≤ − ∑  and  ( ) ,() 0
tt t
ll l l wh πθ ≥ ; li ∀<. 
The interior solution to (3) is: 









λ ∗ + +
=−  ;for  1 j∗ −  farmers. 
This implies that  1 j∗ −  farmers receive their social-gain-maximizing quota and that there 
will be at most one farmer, the  j∗













=− ∑ .  The 





> = .  The proportion of farmers adopting 
the modern irrigation technology is  ( ) F θ
∗ .  With  0 λ > , the socially optimal level of 
adoption will differ from the privately optimal level because the regulator takes into 
account the external costs of providing water, which the farmer does not. 
When collecting water fees is costless (that is  0 λ = ), water-use is given by 
0








=− .  As λ increases, water quotas decrease the most for farmers with 
low types.  If there are senior right holders that are of low type, a reduction in their water 
quotas makes more water available for some junior right holders that may be of higher 
type and use water more efficiently.  Thus, a reduction in water quotas can improve the 
allocation of scarce water between senior right holders and junior right holder through a 
better risk sharing during droughts as shown by Burness and Quirk. 
 
 
   10
Water Allocation under Asymmetric Information 
We now consider the case when the land quality parameter  i θ  is unknown to parties other 
than farmer i.  The regulator uses a direct revelation mechanism to determine water 
quotas and water fees, water users when applying for a water right reveal a parameter  ˆ
i θ  
about their characteristic; the revealed parameter is not necessarily the true parameter  i θ . 




water feeΦ that would be incentive compatible (i.e. ensure truth-telling) and rational.  
This contract  () { } ˆˆ () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ
∗∗ ∗∗
Φ  is determined for every  ˆ
i θ  using a revelation 
mechanism, as described below. 
Let  () ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ , () , () ()
tt t
ii ii i ii ii Py w kw w θ θθ θ θ θ Π= − − Φ  be the profit realized by 
farmer i when his true type is  i θ  and he announces  ˆ
i θ .  The pair  () { } ˆˆ () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ
∗∗ ∗∗
Φ  
is a truth-telling mechanism if it is in the interest of each farmer to reveal his true type.  
To make the notation less burdensome we use a dot on top of the variable to designate the 
derivative of that function with respect to  i θ . 
Proposition 1: A pair  ( ) { } () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ Φ  constitutes an incentive compatible 
mechanism if for all  , i θ θθ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦  we have: 











,   and   11
(6)  () ( ) ( ) ()  () ,()   () ( ) ,( )
i
tt t t t t t t
ii i ii ii ii i i i wP y w hk w cw u h u d u
θ
θ
θθ θ θ π Φ= −− − ∫  ,  where 
(7)   () ( ) () , ()  ()  () 2 ()  ()
tt t t t t t
ii i i i i i wuhu P huwub a huwu π =−   ,  [ ] , i u θ θ ∀∈ . 
Proof: Using the same approach as in Laffont and Tirole (p. 63), one can establish that 
()
t
ii w θ  is a decreasing function of  i θ .  We then use this result to determine the water fee 
that makes the pair  () { } () , ()
tt
ii ii ww θθ Φ  an incentive compatible contract.  The first-order 
condition for truth telling is given by: 















Expression (8) implies: 
(9)   () () ( ) 2 ()
()2 () () () 0
()
t
ii tt t t
ii ii ii ii t
ii
w






−− − = ⎢⎥
∂ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 . 
  If we set  () ( ) () ,() ,
tt t
ii ii i i i wh π θθ θ θ =Π , take its total derivative with respect to  i θ , 
and use (10) to simplify the expression we obtain: 
(10)       ( ) 2
tt t t t
ii i i i Ph w b ah w π =−   . 
We can now integrate (10) between θ  and  i θ  to obtain total profits for farmer i with 
technology t.  We then equate that to the profit expression in (1) and solve for the ex-post 
optimal water fee given by the expression in (6). 
 Proposition  1  establishes the relation between  ( )
t
ii w θ  and  i θ  and the relation 








Φ .  The water fee schedule   12
in (6) imposes second-degree price discrimination, since users are offered different water 
quantities at different prices, but all users of the same type pay the same price for each 
unit of water.  With asymmetric information, a water fee schedule that imposes second-
degree price discrimination is necessary in order to minimize informational rent while 
inducing truth telling.  This is in contrast to the water fee schedule used in the case of full 
information, where social gain can be maximized by using a simpler non-discriminative 
fee schedule.  Any fee schedule that imposes price discrimination results only in a 
transfer of rents between the farmers and the regulator and does not affect aggregate 
social gain. 
The properties of the water fee schedule under asymmetric information cannot be 
studied analytically because the sign of the derivatives with respect to the farmer’s type 
cannot be determined and the derivatives with respect to water quantity cannot be 
obtained in a closed form due to the complexity of the integral function in (6).  A 
computational illustration in the next section is provided for additional insights about the 
shape of the water fee schedule. 
We now turn to the regulator’s problem of determining the water quotas allocated 
under asymmetric information.  We determine these by maximizing the social gain 
function for each of the N farmers subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (5) 
and (10) and the constraint that profits must be non-negative for the senior right holders.  
After substituting for 
t
i π  from (1) into (2) and rearranging we can write the social gain 
function for the i
th farmer as:   13
(11)  () ( ) () ()
2
,() =  ( 1 -) () ()
tt t t t t t t t t t
ii i i i i i i i i i i i Sw h Pdb w h a w h k w c g w θλ θ θ λ π −+ − − − + − . 
If water is available, the regulator's problem is: 
(12)  ()
,




ii ii i i i
w




θ θθ θ ∫   subject to  (5), (10), and  0
t
i π ≥ . 
  Following Laffont and Tirole (p. 67), we solve (12) by writing it as a Hamiltonian 
system with  ( ) i µ θ  denoting the Pontryagin multiplier and considering only constraint 
(10), 
(13)  () ( ) () () ( )
()
2
,, =  ( 1 - ) ( )
                        ( ) 2 .
t t tt tt t t t t
ii i i i i i i i i
tt tt
ii i i i
Hw P d b w h aw h k w c g w f
Ph w b ah w
π µλ λ π θ
µθ
−+ − − − + −
+− 
 
  The first-order conditions are: 
(14)  () () ()
2 (1 ) ( 2 ( ) ) 4 0
tt t t t t
ii i i i i t
i
H




=− − −− + − =
∂
 , 








  and  () 0 µθ = , 
(16)       ( ) 2
tt t t t
ii i i i Ph w b ah w π =−    and  () 0
t
i πθ= . 
  Integrating (15) between  i θ  and θ  and using its boundary condition we get 
() () 1 () ii F µ θλ θ =−  and with (14) we solve for the optimal quantity of water: 
(17)   () ( )
()
(1 ) ( ) (1 )





Pb h h R g k
w
aPh h h R
λ λθ λ
λλ θ




















  The Pontryagin multiplier,  ( ) µ θ , is the marginal contribution of  () .
t
i π  to  ( ) .
t
i S  
which ranges from λ  to zero for all  , i θ θθ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ .  This implies that when  i θ θ =  the   14
contribution of  () .
t
i π  to  () .
t
i S  is maximized. 
  In solving the model in (14) we implicitly assume that the monotonicity constraint 
(7) is met.  This ensures incentive compatibility of the contract.  We can also see that the 
above solution would hold even in the presence of the constraint  0
t
i π ≥ since (12) 
implies that 
t
i π   is non-negative and hence its integral function with respect to  i θ  must 
also be non-negative. 
  With adverse selection, the optimal water quotas are smaller than the optimal 




≤  (see appendix for proof).  This allows more 
junior right holders to use water.  Equation (16) implies that we grant a zero profit for the 
farmer whose type is θ  ( () 0
t
i πθ= ), therefore the proportion of farmers adopting the 
modern technology is  () F θ
∗∗ .  Since the profit expression in (7) is not analytically 
tractable, the technology adoption behavior of farmers is analyzed numerically. 
 
Bilateral Water Trading under Asymmetric Information 
We consider the potential for bilateral trading of water rights under adverse selection and 
explore the pattern of technology adoption induced by water trading.  Consider two water 








 as determined in the 
previous subsection.  Their corresponding profits are  ( ) ,()
tt t
ii i i wh π θ
∗∗ ∗∗  and 
() ,()
tt t
jj i j wh π θ
∗∗ ∗∗ .  Farmers with types below θ
∗∗ adopt the modern irrigation technology 
while those with types above θ
∗∗ adopt the traditional technology.  The reservation levels   15
of profits for each water user are those achieved using the water quota and the choice of 
irrigation technology determined above.  We assume that once the modern technology is 
adopted it cannot be abandoned. 
If trade occurs between i and j, then  ( , ) ij ij i j xx θ θ ≡  denotes the quantity of water 
transferred from a farmer of type  i θ  to a farmer of type  j θ  for a monetary transfer of 
() ji ij mx, from j to i.  When trade occurs the profit functions for i and j are respectively: 
(18) ( ) () () ( ) () ()
2
,( ) ( )
t t tt tt t t t
i ij i i i ij i i ij i ij i ji ij x hP d b h wxa h wx k wxc w m x π
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ =− + − − − − − − − Φ +  
(19) ( ) () () ( ) () ()
2
,( ) ( )
tt t t t t t t t
j ij j j j ij j j ij j ij j ji ij x h Pdb hw x a hw x k w x c w mx π
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ =− + + − + − + − − Φ − . 
Consider the existence of a benevolent broker or a facilitator, such as an irrigation 
district (Landry) or a water-bank (Howitt) whose objective is to maximize the sum of the 
seller and the buyer profits or the social gain generated by the trade.  Under asymmetric 
information, the broker's problem is to use a revelation mechanism to induce agents i and 
j to reveal their types to the broker and to maximize the expected sum of their profits. 
Let  () ˆ (, ) ,()
t
ii j ij ii xh θ θθ Π  be farmer i's profit when he reports a type  ˆ
i θ  to the 
broker while his true type is  i θ .  Similarly for farmer j we have  ( ) ˆ (, ) , ()
t
ji j ij jj xh θ θθ Π .  
The broker maximizes the expected sum of profits: 
(20)     ( ) ( ) ( )
(.) max . .
ij
ij
ij x EE θθΠ+ Π  such that;   16
(21)     () ( ) ˆ (, ) ,() (, ) , ()
jj
tt
ii j ij ii ii j ij ii Ex h Ex h θθ θ θθ θ θθ Π≥ Π, 
(22)     () ( ) ˆ (, ) , () (, ) , ()
ii
tt
ji j ij jj ji j ij jj Ex h Ex h θθ θ θθ θ θθ Π≥ Π, 
(23)     () ( ) (, ) , () ,()
tt t t t
ii j i ji i i i i i xh w h π θθ θ π θ
∗∗ ∗∗ ≥ , 
(24)     () ( ) (, ) , () , ()
tt t t t
ji j ij jj j j jj xh w h π θθ θ π θ
∗∗ ∗∗ ≥ , 
(25)     0( , )
t
ij i j i x w θθ
∗∗ ≤≤ . 
  Constraints (21) and (22) are incentive compatibility constraints that ensure truth 
telling by farmers i and j, while constraint (25) limits the volume of trade to the 
endowments of the seller.  Constraints (23) and (24) grant the trading parties a minimum 
level of profit equal to the profit they had before initiating any water trading.  Here we 
require ex-post individual rationality, which implies that a farmer accepts a trade only if 
the realized profits are at least as large as those in the absence of trade.
3 
  We use the incentive compatible constraints (26) and (27) to rewrite the objective 
function (25) as a sum of expected profits.  For farmer i, truth-telling requires: 
(26)       ( ) ˆ
ˆ


















Using (26) we write the total derivative of  ( ) (, ) ,()
t
ii j ij ii xh θ θθ Π  with respect to  i θ  as:   17
(27)
() ()





                 = ( , ) ( ) 2 ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
jj
t i i i
t
ii i
tt t t t
i i jij ii i i jij iiii j j
E dE h
dh













A farmer whose type  i θ θ = , will not be willing to sell water because no other 
agent with type  j θ θ <  would be willing to pay a price that covers the marginal profit 
foregone by farmer i.  Thus  () ( ) (, ) , () () , ()
tt t t
ii j j i i i xh w h θ θθ π θ θ π
∗∗ ∗∗ Π= = , which is a 
constant.  Indeed an agent whose type is θ  has the lowest quantity of water along with 
the highest productivity of water, as shown in the appendix.  Integrating (27) between  i θ  
and θ , we obtain the incentive compatible profit for i: 
(28) () () () ( )
2









∗∗ ∗∗ Π= − − − − ∫∫
 . 
  In order to get the expected profits for farmer i in (20), we compute the expected 
profit of farmer i with respect to  i θ  from (33) and use Fubini's theorem to get: 








π θθ θ θ
∗∗ ∗∗ Π=− − − − ∫∫∫
 . 
Observe that in addition to  i π  which is fixed in (29), there is an additional quantity that 
represents the expected value of output forgone by i and gained by j when  () , ij i j x θ θ  
units of water are transferred from i to j. 
The replication of the above steps for agent j is straightforward.  If farmer j is a   18
buyer then having a type equal to θ  would grant the agent a zero profit as required by the 
constraint (16) in the previous section.  Applying the same procedure as in equations (26) 
through (29), we obtain the incentive-compatible expected profits for farmer j: 









∗∗ ∗∗ Π= + − + ∫∫∫
 . 
  Expressions (29) and (30) transform the broker’s problem to maximizing the sum 
of incentive-compatible expected profits with respect to the optimal amount of water 
transfer  () , ij i j x θ θ  accompanied by a monetary transfer of  ( ) ji ij mx which satisfies 
constraints (23)-(25).  If we assume the absence of transaction costs related to water 
trading, then  ( ) ji ij mx cancels when we sum (29) and (30).  Applying Leibniz’s rule to 
maximize the sum of (29) and (30) with respect to  ( ) , ij i j x θ θ  and simplifying we obtain 
the following first order condition: 








∗∗ ∗∗ −+ =− +− ∫∫
 . 
If we take the derivative with respect to  i θ  and then with respect to  j θ  on both sides, we 
get the first order condition expressed in the following homogenous parabolic linear 
partial-differential equation of order one and degree one in  ( ) , ij i j x θ θ : 
(32)    
(.) (.)
()() ()() 0










So far, when we introduced adverse selection, we assumed that farmer i is the   19
seller and that farmer j is the buyer.  In fact, regardless of the way we setup the trading 
problem the trading rule derived in (32) remains unchanged and designating one agent as 
buyer and the other as seller is irrelevant.
4 
Proposition 2: Consider a social gain-maximizing independent broker and two agents i 
and j with initial endowments  i w  and  j w  in a given divisible good and private valuations 
for the good.  As long as the expected social gain is positive, the broker is able to 
determine an incentive compatible trading rule that determines the optimal quantity to 
trade and its direction irrespective of the agents' true valuations for the good. 
In this setting, a broker acting as the Walrasian auctioneer who matches the 
buyers and the sellers without seeking gains from the transaction, can bring about 
mutually beneficial agreements between buyers and sellers.  In our setting, it is important 
that the broker is independent and different from the water authority that assigns the 









determined in the previous subsection, are considered constants by the broker, thus 
excluding any renegotiation of the contract between the regulator and the farmers. 
  If we omit the constant terms, the anti-derivative of  ()()
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.  With  0 C  and  1 C  being constants, the general 
solution for (32) is then obtained as follows:   20
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. 
  Expression (33) is a general solution to (32); if farmers are identical no trade 
occurs; therefore  1 0 C = .  The constant  0 C  is a scaling factor that is determined such 
that: 
















where  () () () () ()
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. 
  Now that the optimal water-trading rule is determined, we direct our attention to 
constraints (23)-(25) of the broker's problem.  Let us denote the optimal level of water 
trading by  ij x  found in (33).  For this level to be feasible, it has to be accompanied by a 
monetary transfer given by the expressions below.  The final level of transfer will be 
determined through negotiation between the trading parties: 
(35) () () ( ) () ()
2
() () () +
tt t t t t t
ji ij i i i ij i i ij i ij i m x P d b h wxa h wx k wxc πθ θ
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ≥− − + − − − − + + Φ  
(36) () () ( ) () ()
2
() () ()
tt tt t t t
ji ij j j ij j j ij j ij j j mx Pdb h w x a h w x k w x c θ θπ
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ≤− + + − + − + − − Φ − . 
  Since the water quotas determined by the regulator in the previous subsection are 
decreasing across farmers' types, it is expected that the higher the farmers' type the higher 
is his marginal valuation for water.  This indicates that for trading to generate the highest   21
social gain the lower type must be selling to the higher type farmers.  This implies that at 
the conclusion of the trade it is possible that some of the lower type farmers who sell part 
of their water quota will use their water sales revenues to adopt the modern technology.  
The adoption of the modern technology occurs when post trade incremental net benefits 
of the modern irrigation technology exceed its cost as stated by the following condition: 
(37)  () ( ) ( )( ) () () () ()
LH L LH LH
ii j i i i i ii j i i i i Pw x h h b aw x h h c θθ θθ
∗∗ ∗∗ ⎡⎤ −− − −+ ≥ ⎣⎦ . 
In this section, we showed that the existence of adverse selection makes water 
regulation inefficient even if a nonlinear pricing scheme is devised.  We then examined 
the use of water trading as a policy to increase the efficiency of water allocation and 
devised a trading rule that is incentive compatible.  If condition (37) is fulfilled, 
additional technology adoption by the sellers is to be expected.  The existence of water 
trading allows for a better allocation of resources across farmers and gives incentives to 
adopt better irrigation technologies, while increasing the social welfare in comparison to 
the non-trading solution.  However, intuitively the additional adoption of irrigation 
technologies cannot approach the first best level.  This is because the presence of 
informational asymmetries prevents some transactions that would be possible under full 
information from occurring.  In the following section, we provide additional insights by 
numerically simulating the model developed above. 
 
Numerical Illustration and Additional Insights 
For illustration, we use a quadratic production function with  6, 10.68 db = = , and   22
1.7 a = , based on data from southern California and Arizona for fruits and vegetables 
production (Caswell and Zilberman).  Output price is assumed to be $100 per unit of 
output.  The additional setup costs required to adopt the modern technology range 
between $50 and $100 per acre; we use the value of 
H c =$75 per acre to illustrate our 
results.  Irrigation effectiveness for the traditional technology is different from that with 
the modern technology and depends on the coefficient  i α .  Caswell and Zilberman report 
that in western United States when  0.6 i θ =  the effectiveness of the modern technology 
(drip), (0.6) 0.95
H h =  implying that  0.1, i i α = ∀ .
5  We assume that the private cost of the 
energy to pump water from its source to the field is k=15 per acre-foot of water, as in 
Caswell and Zilberman where water is pumped from a well.
6  We assume also that 
farmers are charged  $80 g =  per acre-foot of water.  We take the average social cost of 
public funds  0.3 λ =  reported by Boyer and Laffont (p. 140) for developed economies.  













, where z is a Gaussian distribution with mean 
2
θ θ +
 and variance 
1, and Z its cumulative distribution. 
The incentive compatible profits under these assumptions are plotted in figure 1.a, 
and show that the introduction of adverse selection significantly reduces the adoption of 
modern technology relative to that under full information.  Under full information the 
critical value of farmer's type below which the modern technology is adopted and above 
which the traditional technology is maintained is  7.66 θ
∗ = .  Under adverse selection, the   23
threshold level for technology switching is located at a much lower level ( 5.22 θ
∗∗ = ) 
than under full information.  Figure 1.b depicts the optimal water quantity for every 
farmer’s type under full information and under adverse selection.  Both curves are 
piecewise monotonically decreasing with a discontinuity at the critical θ  levels where 
there is a switch in the technology adopted.
7  The dashed line shows that under adverse 
selection, water quotas assigned to the low type farmers using the modern technology and 
the very high type farmers using the traditional technology are smaller than under full 
information while medium type farmers receive higher water quotas than under full 
information.  These water quotas and equation (6) are used to compute the water fees 
depicted in figure 1.c.
8  These show that under adverse selection most farmers (except 
some of the medium type) pay a lower water fee compared to the full information case.  
Given the distortions introduced by adverse selection one might ask why the regulator 
does not retire the contract that allows for low technology adoption and offers only the 
one that requires the use of the modern technology.  Doing so would significantly lower 
the profits of the most productive farmers; in practice, those farmers might choose not to 
farm any more and only low productivity farmers will remain in the sector, which 
obviously is not desirable from the point of view of the regulator. 
Figure 1.d depicts the social gain functions and it shows, as expected, that under 
full information the socially desirable threshold level for switching technology is at a 
higher level than the level determined by the farmers in figure 1.a.  However, because of 
informational rents and because farmers do not take into account the cost of public funds 
λ , the socially desirable switching point under adverse selection is at a lower level than   24
the level determined by the farmers ( 5.13 θ =  instead of 5.22).  In principal-agent 
models, it is expected that the social gain obtained under adverse selection will be lower 
than the social gain under full information if all other elements of the model, such as the 
water fee schedule remain the same.  In our model, the pricing schedule is different 
across the two scenarios for reasons explained above.  With the traditional technology, 
the water fee under adverse selection is lower for almost all farmers’ types in general and 
for the highest types in particular who maintain an almost unchanged level of water 
quotas under both the full and asymmetric information cases.  Therefore the high types 
are able to generate more net value which explains their higher level of social gain under 
asymmetric information when tL = . 
The results above show that the introduction of adverse selection and the use of 
nonlinear and discriminative water pricing although leading to a lower level of water 
quotas, induces a lower level of technology adoption.  The reduction in technology 
adoption is due to low water fee when tL =  this induces some farmers to keep the 
traditional technology rather then switch to the modern technology.  We now examine if 
a move toward water trading might lessen the distortions produced by adverse selection. 
  We are interested in examining the potential for trading and for additional 
technology adoption in the range of θ θ
∗∗ > .  These are the types that found it more 
profitable to adopt the traditional technology under adverse selection.  We therefore focus 
on the range of  5.22 θθ
∗∗ >=  shown in figure 1.a.  In figure 2.a we provide a contour 
plot of possible trade levels from a farmer of type  i θ  to a farmer of type  j θ  as determined   25
by the trading rule in (33).
9  It shows that the highest possible, not necessarily feasible, 
trading occurs when ()
2
,, ij θ θθ θ
∗∗ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ .  The positive and negative values of the 
contours indicate that in the region above the 45-degree line, farmer j is a buyer since his 
marginal valuation of water is higher than that of farmer i.  Below the 45-degree line j 
will be the seller and i is the buyer, for illustration we are focusing on trades with i as 
seller and j as buyer and have labeled the axis accordingly.  By symmetry, one can show 
corresponding areas below the 45-degree line where j is the seller and i is the buyer.  
These results are consistent with the intuition that farmers with high marginal valuations 
for water will be water buyers and farmers with low marginal valuation for water will be 
water sellers. 
  For a trade level to be feasible it has to be met by a monetary transfer that fulfills 
(35) and (36).  In figure 2.a, we highlight the feasible levels of trade from i to j leading to 
the adoption of the modern technology (( )
2
,, ij θ θθ θ
∗∗ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ ) as determined by condition 
(37).  Trade by lower levels of  i θ , that is ( ) ,, , ij θ θθ θ θ θ
∗∗∗ ∗ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ∈× ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦  do not lead to the 
adoption of the modern technology.  They only lead to minor adjustments of water use 
across farmers.  Trade leads to additional modern irrigation technology adoption when 
the net gains of technology adoption are higher than the cost of adoption as depicted in 
condition (37). 
  The above analysis gives an assessment of the possible trades that farmers of 
different types may engage in and their implications for technology adoption.  The final 
level of monetary transfer is determined through negotiation between the seller and the   26
buyer, and cannot be determined within the framework presented here.  Nevertheless, for 
various potential water trade levels that induce modern irrigation technology adoption, 
represented in the contour plot in figure 2.a, we show the monetary transfers above the 
reservation level in (35) that would support them in figure 2.b.  Figure 2.b is a zoom-in 
on the combinations of  i θ  and  j θ  that would lead to modern irrigation technology 
adoption.  We find that some water volumes can be traded for up to $50 above the 
reservation level in (35).  For a given buyer’s type  j θ , as the seller’s type  i θ  moves away 
from 5.22 θ
∗∗ =  the seller’s potential surplus decreases, i.e. the interval for  () ji ij mx 
defined by (35) and (36) shrinks and monetary transfer he is willing to make decreases. 
 
Conclusion 
We showed that adverse selection induces less technology adoption than full information 
but that even under adverse selection, bilateral water trading among farmers can reduce 
the distortion created in the allocation of water quotas relative to the situation with full 
information.  Water trading is shown to occur for two reasons.  First, they occur for 
minor adjustments amongst low type farmers who have already adopted the modern 
irrigation technology and second, they occur between farmers who did not adopt the 
modern irrigation technology.  In the latter case, water is transferred from low type 
farmers to higher type farmers.  In this case, it is possible that the revenues from water 
transfer enable the adoption of modern technology but not to reach a first best level.  The 
results of the numerical analysis showed that the existence of a second phase of trading 
after the regulator initially allocates the water quotas generates important social gains and   27
induces additional technology adoption that the initial allocation of water resources could 
not achieve alone. 
In developing the model in this article, we considered only one-shot games and 
excluded contract renegotiation.  In the context of water rights, this assumption is not 
restrictive since water rights usually span a long period; therefore, each time the contract 
is designed past information is of little relevance.  We have also overlooked the existence 
of transaction costs related to trade; some studies show substantial gains from water 
trading compared to its transaction costs (Easter).  In the model above, we assumed that 
the private cost k is not type-dependent.  However, we suspect that an extension of the 
model where k is decreasing with respect to the farmer’s type will not introduce a 
qualitative change to the results.  Since water use is decreasing with respect to the 
farmer’s type, the total private cost  ( )
t
ii kw θ  is also decreasing with respect to farmer’s 
type.  Parameterizing k will not produce countervailing incentives to alter the above 
revelation mechanism.  A better alternative to pricing could be an auction of water rights 
instead of the determination of water quotas by the regulator and a second market to 
correct for any inefficient allocation of water rights.  Water auctions have been used in 
Victoria, Australia (Simon and Anderson).  However, the results of the auction depend on 
the auction rules selected and on the capacity of the regulator to prevent cheating and 
rigging.  Additionally, the implementation of water auctions seems to be more suitable 
for new water resources where no previous rights could be claimed and not for the case 
with prior appropriation rights on water examined here.   28
Appendix 
Optimal Water Quota: Full Information vs. Adverse Selection 
We compare the optimal water quota obtained under full information with the one 
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  A simplification and rearrangement of (A1) gives: 
(A2)     ( )
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=−  and considering our assumptions we get: 













− > . 
  Expression (A3) implies that  2 2 (1 ) 0
t Pbh k g λ − −+ > , therefore expression (A2) 
is indeed positive; therefore, the water quota under adverse selection is less than the 
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1 http://www.wrd.state.or.us , http://www.idwr.state.id.us/water , http://water.state.co.us/ , 
http://nrwrt1.nr.state.ut.us 
2 To keep matters simple, we assume that there is no market power and no third party 
effects related to the transfer or trade of water rights.  Saleth, Braden, and Eheart, address 
those issues under full information. 
3 This is a much stronger requirement than the interim individual rationality requirement 
where constraints (23) and (24) would be replaced by their expected values (Gresik). 
4 If we assume that  (.) ij x  is negative and replace  (.) ij x  by  (.) ji x − , (32) remains 
unchanged. 
5 We assume that  i α  is the same for all farmers irrespective of  i θ . 
6 This cost is not relevant here but for generality, we include it in the analysis. 
7 Under adverse selection, the monotonicity condition is not always fulfilled as is the case 
here for low values of θ .  We force monotonicity by bunching together lower values of 
4.06 θ ≤  (see Laffont and Tirole, p. 121-123). 













=+ ∑ ∫  with step size  1/1000 dt = . 
9 Water trading from a farmer of type  j θ  to a farmer of type  i θ  are symmetric to the trade 
from a farmer of type  i θ  to a farmer of type  j θ , they are represented with negative value 
in the contour plot of figure 2.a.   30
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(a) Profit & Technology Adoption



















(d) Social Gain & Desirable Technology Adoption
 
Figure 1: Water quotas and fees, profits, and social gains under full information and adverse selection   34
 
 
Figure 2: Water trading and technology adoption feasibility 
 